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Inheritance Tax-Tax on Specific Bequess-"Tax on a
Tax Ad Infinitum" Held Improper
Testator made specific bequests to various individuals, providing that her executor should pay all inheritance and estate taxes
out of the residue. The executor paid the taxes due on each bequest,
but the tax commissioner treated the tax due on each bequest as
an additional bequest, thus imposing a "tax on a tax ad infinitum."
The lower court ruled against the commissioner. Held, affirmed.
The inheritance tax statute does not authorize a "tax on a tax ad
infinitum." W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 11 (Michie 1955). Glessner
v. Carman, State Tax Comm'r, 118 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1961).
When a decedent's will provides that all taxes should be paid
out of the residue of the estate, is the tax saving to the legatees
an additional bequest which should be included as part of the
taxable estate? The instant case provided the West Virginia Supreme
Court with its first opportunity to rule on that question. Prior to
the West Virginia decision only six states had ruled on the question,
five holding that an additional tax should be imposed. The two
most recent decisions, of which one is the West Virginia case, have
not followed the earlier decisions. First, the Pennsylvania court
in 1960, and now the West Virginia court in 1961, have decided
the question contrary to the prevailing view.
The West Virginia court based its decision on the wording of
the statute which provides that, "The market value of property
is its actual market after deducting debts and encumbrances for
which the same is liable. . .

."

W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 11, § 5

(Michie 1955). Also, W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 11, § 12 (Michie
1955), provides that the tax is to be determined by the market
value of all the property subject to the tax, and that the payment
shall be made out of the estate in the same manner as other debts
may be paid. From this wording the West Virginia court said, in
order to find that a tax was due on the money paid out of the
estate to cover the inheritance tax, the tax would have to be considered as both a debt and a devise. The West Virginia court held
that this construction was not possible from the wording of the
statute. What the legislative intent may have been is unclear, but
because of the ambiguity in the statute, the court held that the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
It would seem that the Pennsylvania court had more justification for its opinion in the case of In re Loeb's Estate, 400 Pa. 368,
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162 A.2d 207 (1960). The statute in Pennsylvania is worded differently than the comparable West Virginia section, and it seems
to better justify the interpretation of the Pennsylvania court. The
applicable Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2301
(1949), provides that the inheritance tax is payable on the clear
value of the property passing to the legatee. Prior rulings by the
Pennsylvania court lend support to such an interpretation of the tax.
The tax is on the right of inheritance, not on the property itself.
In re Schmuckli's Estate, 341 Pa. 36, 17 A.2d 876 (1941). The
tax is on the transfer of property and not on the estate itself, thus
the only property to be taxed is that portion of the net clear estate
which passes to the distributees. In re Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa.
520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943). The Pennsylvania court said in the
Loeb case, supra, that in order to impose this additional tax on
the taxes paid out of the estate, it would be necessary to consider
this as two legacies. The court held that this could not be done,
either from the interpretation of the statute or from the will of the
decedent. During the last thirty-nine years the Pennsylvania tax
commissioner has interpreted the inheritance tax act as not imposing
a tax on the taxes paid out of an estate. The commissioner in the
Loeb case, supra, was attempting to change this interpretation to
bring Pennsylvania in line with the other jurisdictions which had
decided this question. But the court concluded that the interpretation, having endured for so long, was a part of the law of Pennsylvania, and that it was the interpretation the Pennsylvania legislature
had intended since no amendment had been made to change it.
Other cases which have decided the question of whether a
tax on a tax should be imposed when the inheritance taxes are
paid out of the estate are: In re Irwin's Estate, 196 Cal. 366, 237
Pac. 1074 (1925); Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 23 A.2d 767
(1942); In re Bowlin's Estate, 189 Minn. 196, 248 N.W. 741
(1933); In re Henry's Estate, 189 Wash. 510, 66 P.2d 350 (1937);
and In re Levalley's Estate, 191 Wis. 356, 210 N.W. 941 (1926).
All of these cases have followed the California decision which was
first in point of time. The rationale of the decisions is that when
a legatee receives a bequest on which the taxes have been paid, he
has been saved some expense, thus this saving should be considered
as an additional bequest to him. As an additional bequest it would
have to be taxed, and thus the "tax on a tax ad infinitum." These
cases have said that such an interpretation must be given the tax
statute. Any other interpretation would enable the testator to defeat
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the inheritance tax by directing the tax to be paid out of the residue
of his estate. The West Virginia court did not seem concerned
about this method of escaping the inheritance tax, and said that
there were other examples of tax saving which had been written
into the act itself.
If the West Virginia Legislature does not amend the inheritance
tax, the available savings could be substantial. f the tax rate were,
for example, ten per cent, and testator I wished to leave 60,000 dollars to A, a tax of 6,000 dollars would result. If T were to provide
that A get 54,000 dollars and the inheritance tax be paid out of the
estate, the tax would amount to only 5,400 dollars and a tax saving
of 600 dollars could be realized. Until such change occurs, the
payment of such taxes from the residuary clause offers an attractive technique for tax saving.
Robert Glenn Steele

Torts-Statutes of Limitations-Malpractice Actions
Involving Objects Left in Surgical Patients
P underwent an operation on April 26, 1955, and after receiving post-operative attention, was discharged from the hospital
on May 5, 1955. Her last visit to D, a physician, was on November
14, 1955. After the operation P constantly suffered from back
trouble and was X-rayed to determine the cause in August, 1958.
The X-rays disclosed a wing nut in her abdomen. P instituted an
action against D on August 13, 1959, for his negligence during the
operation. The lower court held that P's action was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations. Held, reversed. The statute of limitations on a cause of action for malpractice based on negligent failure
to remove a foreign object from patient's body during the course
of an operation began to. r n when the patient kiew or had redson
to know about the foreign object and existence of a cause of -action
based upon its presence. Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J.
1961).
The issue presented to the court in the principal case is one
that has arisen many times and one that has been ruled on by many
courts throughout the land. By its present decision, the New Jersey
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